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Twitter	is	now	one	of	our	primary	venues	for	public	discourse.	But	it	is	not	a	neutral	or	
transparent	medium.	Twitter	shapes	how	we	interact,	who	we	interact	with,	and	—	perhaps	
most	importantly	—	it	suggests	specific	goals	for	those	interactions.	Twitter	doesn’t	just	pro-
vide	a	speaking	platform,	nor	are	its	effects	confined	to	algorithmic	filtering.	Twitter	shapes	
our	goals	for	discourse	by	making	conversation	something	like	a	game.	Twitter	scores	our	
conversation.	And	it	does	so,	not	in	terms	of	our	own	particular	and	rich	purposes	for	com-
munication,	but	in	terms	of	its	own	pre-loaded,	painfully	thin	metrics:	Likes,	Retweets,	and	
Follower	counts.	And	if	we	take	up	Twitter’s	invitation	and	internalize	those	evaluations,	we	
will	be	thinning	out	and	simplifying	our	own	goals	for	communication.		
	Let’s	take	a	step	back.	Twitter	is	at	once	pluralistic	in	its	scope	and	monolithic	in	its	tech-
nological	form.	Twitter	is	pluralistic	because	it	offers	relatively	open	access	to	powerful	re-
sources	for	public	discourse.	Anybody	can	form	an	account,	and	anybody	with	the	right	feel	
for	the	medium,	it	seems,	can	gather	enormous	numbers	of	followers.	Twitter	democratizes	
access	to	large-scale	communication,	which	once	had	been	held	by	a	relatively	small	number	
of	media	companies.1	At	the	same	time,	Twitter	is	monolithic,	because	everybody	who	uses	
 
1	My	understanding	of	Twitter	here	has	been	particularly	informed	by	Zeynep	Tufekci’s	(2017)	thought-
ful	analysis	of	the	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	this	pluralism.	
 
2 
Twitter	must	communicate	through	the	same	interfaces,	and	be	subject	to	the	same	algo-
rithms.2	What	is	the	impact	of	so	much	public	discourse	being	shoveled	through	one	plat-
form?		
Other	discussions	of	Twitter	have	focused	on	the	enforced	shortness	of	tweets,	the	influ-
ence	of	hidden	algorithmic	filtering,	the	promotion	of	group	polarization,	the	lack	of	account-
ability	mechanisms,	and	the	collapse	of	conversational	contexts	(Sunstein,	2009,	46-96;	Mar-
wick	and	boyd,	2011;	Miller	and	Record,	2013;	Frost-Arnold,	2014;	Rini,	2017).	I	would	like	
to	focus	on	another	basic	feature	of	Twitter	—	one	whose	importance	and	impacts,	I	think,	
has	not	been	adequately	appreciated.	Twitter	gamifies	communication	by	offering	immedi-
ate,	vivid,	and	quantified	evaluations	of	one’s	conversational	success.	Twitter	offers	us	points	
for	discourse;	it	scores	our	communication.	And	these	game-like	features	are	responsible	for	
much	of	Twitter’s	psychological	wallop.	Twitter	is	addictive,	in	part,	because	it	feels	so	good	
to	watch	those	numbers	go	up	and	up.	In	fact,	the	design	of	Twitter	and	its	scoring	mecha-
nisms	have	been	significantly	informed	by	design	strategies	fostered	in	the	Las	Vegas	gam-
bling	industry	—	strategies	which	overtly	seek	to	increase	the	addictiveness	of	their	prod-
ucts.3	
The	clear	scoring	system	brings	with	it	another	very	game-like	aspect:	a	clear	and	unam-
biguous	ranking.	We	usually	don’t	emerge	from	the	party	with	a	ranked	list	of	who	the	best	
 
2	This	pattern	of	thought	has	been	particularly	influenced	by	Tufekci’s	(2018)	discussion	of	how	the	In-
ternet	era	has	democratized	communication,	but	at	the	same	time	subjected	all	online	communication	to	a	
few	very	small	portals.	The	Internet	is	democratic	because	anybody	can	put	up	a	web-page,	but	it	is	mono-
lithic	because	we	all	find	web-pages	using	Google	Search	-	so	Google	Search’s	algorithm	becomes	an	all-pow-
erful	control	on	our	collective	attention.	Obviously,	in	the	background,	is	Marshall	McLuhan’s	(McLuhan,	
1964)	discussion	of	the	impact	of	medium	over	content.	
3	Natasha	Dow	Schull’s	Addiction	by	Design	(2012)	offers	a	thorough	look	at	the	technological	innovations	
of	the	gambling	industry	to	optimize	the	addictiveness	of	their	products.	Since	that	book,	Schull	has	been	vo-
cal	about	how	those	technologies	have	been	adopted	by	gaming	and	social	media	companies	(Madrigal,	2013;	
National	Public	Radio,	2014;	Seymour,	2019).	
 
3 
conversationalists	were.	Twitter,	on	the	other	hand,	offers	both	short-term	rankings	(Likes	
and	Retweet	numbers	for	each	tweet)	and	long-term	rankings	(Follower	counts).	Most	im-
portantly,	 the	 rankings	 are	 entirely	 unambiguous.	 Unlike	 conversation	 in	 the	wild,	 I	 can	
know	exactly	how	well	each	tweet	did,	and	I	can	instantly	compare	my	overall	popularity	
with	that	of	any	other	user.	This	can	provide	all	sorts	of	pleasures:	the	thrill	of	victory,	when	
we	see	those	numbers	tick	up;	and	the	sense	of	long-term	achievement,	presented	in	precise	
and	unquestionable	quantitative	form.		
Supporters	of	gamification	say	that	it	is	a	technology	for	increasing	motivation.	Gamifi-
cation	can	supposedly	imbue	everyday	activities	with	all	the	fun	and	excitement	of	a	game.4	
Here,	then,	is	an	optimistic	view	of	Twitter:	by	gamifying	public	discourse,	Twitter	increases	
overall	participation,	and	so	helps	us	to	reap	the	rewards	of	public	discourse	—	such	as	a	
more	fully	politically	engaged	populace.		
I	do	not	accept	the	optimistic	view.	Crucially,	I	don’t	think	that	gamification	merely	in-
creases	our	motivation	to	perform	an	activity	while	preserving	all	the	original	goods	of	that	
activity.	Gamification	increases	our	motivation	by	changing	the	nature	of	the	activity.	Often,	
the	goals	of	ordinary	activity	are	rich	and	subtle.	When	we	gamify	these	activities,	we	change	
those	goals	to	make	them	artificially	clear.	Games	are	more	satisfying	than	ordinary	life	pre-
cisely	because	game-goals	are	simpler,	clearer,	and	easier	 to	apply.	 In	games	proper,	 this	
simplification	isn’t	particularly	problematic,	because	the	goals	are	peculiarly	artificial.	Game	
activities,	and	their	associated	goals,	are	usually	kept	secluded	from	ordinary	life.	But	there	
 
4	This	point	was	put	most	influentially	by	Jane	McGonigal	(2011).	For	critical	discussion,	an	excellent	
starting	place	is	(Walz	et.	al.,	2015).	
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is	no	such	protective	separation	when	we	gamify	ordinary	activities.	To	reap	the	motiva-
tional	benefits	of	gamification,	we	must	re-shape	the	ends	which	govern	our	real-life	activi-
ties.	
Pre-gamification,	the	aims	of	discourse	are	complex	and	many.	Some	of	us	want	to	trans-
mit	information	or	to	persuade;	some	of	us	want	friendship.	Some	of	us	want	to	join	together	
in	the	pursuit	of	truth	and	understanding.	Twitter	gamifies	discourse	and,	in	so	doing,	offers	
us	 re-engineered	goals	 for	our	 communicative	 acts.	Twitter	 invites	us	 to	 shift	 our	values	
along	 its	 pre-fabricated	 lines.	We	 start	 to	 chase	higher	Likes	 and	Retweets	 and	Follower	
counts	—	and	those	are	very	different	targets.		
Others	of	us	may	come	to	Twitter	already	interested	in	popularity	and	status.	For	those,	
the	gamification	of	Twitter	may	not	represent	such	a	radical	change	in	the	basic	content	of	
their	goals.	But	even	for	those	already	interested	in	popularity,	Twitter	can	change	the	way	
in	which	they	conceive	of	popularity	–	by	making	highly	salient	a	handful	of	specific	metrics	
for	popularity.	Like	and	Follower	counts	are	not	the	only	way	to	conceive	of	popularity,	but	
they	the	measure	that	Twitter	highlights.		
What’s	more,	the	effect	of	Twitter’s	gamification,	across	the	community	Twitter	users,	
will	tend	towards	levelling	and	flattening	the	diversity	of	values.	Insofar	as	Twitter’s	gamifi-
cation	motivates	its	users,	then	it	will	drag	all	of	its	users’	communicative	values	in	the	same	
direction	–	 towards	the	same	metric.	Gamification	homogenizes	the	value	 landscape.	And	
this	phenomenon	will	help	explain	some	of	the	more	socially	toxic	aspects	of	Twitter.	The	
technology	invites	us	to	focus	our	cares	on	the	narrow	task	of	getting	points	and	going	viral.	
And	that	goal	 is	 in	tension	with	our	 interest	 in	having	morally	sensitive	and	openhearted	
communication.	This	gamification	 invites	us,	 instead,	 to	view	communication	through	the	
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lens	of	competition,	victory,	and	success	on	Twitter’s	very	specific	terms.		
Let	me	emphasize	the	fact	that	Twitter	offers	us	an	invitation	to	change	our	values.	Twit-
ter	will	not	change	our	values	for	us.	It	is	a	system	designed	to	offer	us	pleasure	in	return	for	
simplifying	our	values	–	but	we	still	have	to	take	up	that	offer.	But	it	does	ease	the	way	for	us	
considerably,	by	offering	a	pre-prepared	and	seductively	designed	pathway.	
Of	course,	Twitter	isn’t	the	only	place	where	gamification	influences	communication,	dis-
course,	 and	 collective	 understanding.	 We	 can	 see	 similar	 effects	 with	 Facebook’s	 Likes,	
YouTube’s	clickthrough	and	watchthrough	counts,5	academic	citation	rates,	and	more.	But	
here	I	wish	to	explore,	in	details,	how	gamification	impacts	discourse	and	knowledge-pro-
duction	in	one	particular	instantiation,	as	an	opening	step	towards	understanding	life	in	the	
time	of	quantification.		
	
	
Games	and	Gamification	
Why	gamify?	If	there	is	a	Bible	to	the	contemporary	gamification	movement,	 it	 is	Jane	
McGonigal’s	book,	Reality	is	Broken:	How	Games	Make	Us	Better	and	How	They	Can	Change	
the	World.6	McGonigal	provides	a	clear	—	and	very	influential	—	argument	for	gamification.	
Ordinary	life,	she	says,	is	quite	painful.	Everyday	activities,	like	work,	education,	and	chores,	
are	dull	and	repetitive.	But	luckily,	she	says,	we	already	have	an	extremely	effective	technol-
ogy	for	eliminating	drudgery:	computer	games.	By	importing	key	design	features	from	mod-
 
5	The	YouTube	examples	were	suggested	by	Mark	Alfano.	
6	For	a	more	technique-oriented	design	manual	for	gamification,	see	Chou	(2015).	
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ern	gaming	into	ordinary	activities,	we	can	transform	daily	life	into	something	far	more	en-
joyable	(McGonigal,	2011).		
In	so	many	modern	computer	games,	we	voluntarily	engage	in	what	looks,	from	the	out-
side,	 like	 pure	 drudgery.	Many	 games,	 particularly	 computer	 role-playing	 games,	 involve	
what’s	known	as	“grinding”	—	performing	simple,	repetitive	activities	to	slowly	build	up	var-
ious	in-game	points	and	currency.	Grinding	can	involve	killing	easy	enemies,	over	and	over	
again,	for	experience	points	and	gold	—	or	laboriously	gathering	piles	of	ingredients	in	order	
to	craft	equipment.	Why	are	people	willing	to	engage	in	such	drudgery	in	their	spare	time	
when	they	avoid	such	activities	like	the	plague	in	real	life?	The	answer	seems	to	lie	in	the	
powerful	 feedback	 and	 reward	mechanisms	 available	 in	 games,	 especially	 contemporary	
computer	games.	In	such	games,	we	are	given	immediate	rewards	for	our	achievements	in	
the	form	of	points,	leveling	up,	achievement	badges,	and	the	like.	Games	quantize	our	suc-
cesses,	making	our	progress	clear	and	vivid.	McGonigal	emphasizes,	in	particular,	how	games	
offer	us	a	steady	sense	of	progress	and	victory,	through	a	constant	stream	of	clear	feedback,	
in	the	terms	of	the	accumulation	of	points	(52-63).7	So	why	can’t	we	borrow	those	feedback	
and	reward	mechanisms,	and	slather	them	over	real-life	activities?	
We’ve	seen,	in	recent	years,	many	efforts	to	gamify	the	workplace	and	the	school.	Busi-
ness	entrepreneurs	seem	particularly	interested	in	gamification’s	ability	to	increase	worker	
productivity	 by	 increasing	 worker	 motivation.	 Disney	 famously	 gamified	 its	 hospitality	
 
7	The	mechanisms	for	this	are	complex.	McGonigal	provides	a	survey	of	the	empirical	literature;	for	a	
more	pessimistic	counterpoint,	see	Schull’s	work	on	game	addiction	and	its	relationship	to	points.	Schull’s	
account	stresses	the	way	in	which	the	exact	timing	of	the	quantized	reward	in	certain	game	designs	triggers	
addictive	surges	of	serotonin.	
 
7 
workforce,	providing	leaderboards	and	rankings	for	speedy	performance.	Notably,	the	sys-
tem	increased	productivity,	at	the	expense	of	also	increasing	the	injury	rate.	And	workers	
hated	the	system,	calling	it	the	“electronic	whip”	—	and	saying	that	they	couldn’t	help	being	
motivated	by	it,	even	though	they	detested	the	intrusion	(Gabrielle,	2018).	We’ve	seen	the	
introduction	of	 gamification	 into	 fitness,	with	 technologies	 like	FitBit	 and	Strava	offering	
game-like	structures	of	points,	rankings,	and	leaderboards	for	exercise.	We’ve	seen	gamified	
education	in	schools,	and	in	various	apps.	The	popular	language	learning	app	DuoLingo	gam-
ifies	language	learning	by	offering	its	users	points	and	virtual	medals	for	achieving	various	
daily	goals,	like	learning	new	vocabulary	words.		
McGonigal	and	her	fellow	gamification	advocates	are	optimistic	about	the	utopian	poten-
tial	of	gamification.	In	McGonigal’s	picture,	gamification	is	an	unalloyed	good:	it	simply	re-
moves	drudgery	and	adds	pleasure.	But	her	optimism	depends	on	believing	that	gamification	
can	achieve	these	psychological	goods	while	adequately	preserving	the	value	of	the	activity.		
When	we	understand	the	source	of	gamification’s	motivational	power,	we	will	see	the	
problem	with	McGonigal’s	optimism.	Gamification	involves	a	trade:	it	increases	our	motiva-
tion	in	an	activity	by	narrowing	and	simplifying	the	target	of	that	activity	—	which,	in	turn,	
changes	 the	nature	of	 the	activity.	And	this	may	be	 fine	when	the	activity	has	a	naturally	
simple	target,	as	is	possibly	the	case	with	language	learning.	But	the	goals	of	discourse	are	
many	and	subtle,	and	gamification	threatens	to	destroy	much	of	that	diversity	and	subtlety.		
The	 usual	 view	 among	 gamification	 advocates	 is	 to	 treat	 games	 and	 gamification	 as	
providing	the	same	sort	of	value.	Insofar	as	games	are	good,	the	story	goes,	then	gamification	
must	also	be	good,	since	it	makes	life	more	like	a	game.	But	this	view	conceals	the	profound	
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differences	between	games	proper	and	the	gamification	of	real-world	activities.	To	under-
stand	that,	we’ll	need	a	clearer	account	of	the	nature	and	value	of	games.	
Let	me	summarize	my	account	of	games,	which	I	have	developed	in	excruciating	detail	
elsewhere.8	Games,	I’ve	argued,	are	the	art	form	that	works	in	the	medium	of	agency.	The	
game	designer	doesn’t	just	create	characters,	stories,	and	environments.	The	game	designer	
sculpts	the	temporary	agency	that	the	player	will	occupy	during	the	game.	They	design,	not	
only	a	world,	but	who	the	player	will	be	in	that	world.	I	do	not	just	mean	that	the	game	de-
signer	provides	a	fictional	backstory	for	a	character.	They	design	the	essential	agential	struc-
ture	of	the	in-game	actor.	They	designate	what	the	in-game	agent’s	abilities	and	affordances	
will	be	—	whether	they	will	be	a	jumper,	a	shooter,	a	builder	or	an	information	gatherer.	
And,	most	importantly,	the	game	designer	sets	the	in-game	agent’s	motivations	by	setting	the	
goals	of	the	game.		
And	the	game	player	submerges	themselves	in	this	sculpted	agency,	temporarily.	Game-
playing	involves	the	temporary	adoption	of	an	alternate	set	of	goals.	Why	do	all	this?	For	one	
thing,	our	goals	in	game-life	are	so	much	clearer	than	in	ordinary	life.	In	ordinary	life,	our	
goals	are	often	obscure.	We	often	don’t	know	exactly	what	we’re	doing	—	or	we	find	our	
reasons	hard	to	articulate	and	difficult	to	apply.	And	we	are	beset	with	a	confusing	welter	of	
values	–	both	from	within	our	own	value	system,	and	from	the	bruising	value	complexity	of	
the	social	world.	But	games	offer	a	relief	from	all	that.	While	playing	a	game,	we	know	exactly	
what	we	are	trying	to	do	—	and	afterwards,	we	know	exactly	how	well	we	have	done.	Success	
in	a	game	is	clear	and	unmistakable.	There	are	points.		
And	game	values	usually	fit	neatly	with	one	another.	In	ordinary	life,	our	values	are	hard	
 
8	The	present	account	relies	on	material	drawn	from	Nguyen	(2017;	2018;	2020).	
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to	balance.	I	care	about	spending	time	with	my	loved	ones,	raising	my	children	right,	writing	
good	philosophy,	enjoying	myself	in	rock	climbing,	staying	healthy,	and	eating	delicious	food.	
Not	only	are	my	values	often	in	tension,	but	there	is	usually	no	way	to	precisely	compare	
them.	How	do	I	compare	achievements	under	one	of	these	goals	against	sacrifices	in	another?	
What,	exactly,	is	the	cost-benefit	analysis	for	choosing	between	working	today	or	taking	my	
children	to	the	aquarium?	But	with	games,	there	is	usually	a	clear	central	currency	of	value.	
A	game	tells	me	to	achieve	victory	points	and	then	tells	me	exactly	how	many	victory	points	
things	are	worth.9	The	goods	of	a	game	are	readily	commensurable,	by	design.		
In	ordinary	life,	values	are	often	inchoate,	subtle,	and	difficult	to	apply.	But	in	games,	val-
ues	are	easy.	Games	offer	us	a	momentary	experience	of	value	clarity.	They	are	a	balm	for	the	
existential	pains	of	real	life.	In	games,	we	know	exactly	what	we	are	doing	and	why	we	are	
doing	it.	And	when	we	are	done,	we	know	exactly	how	well	we	have	done.	Games	offer	us	a	
momentary	respite	from	the	value	confusion	of	the	world.	
It	is	relatively	easy	for	the	game	designer	to	create	value	clarity,	because	the	values	in	
games	are	entirely	artificial.	The	game	designer	can	just	tell	us	what	to	care	about,	and	play-
ers	simply	care	about	it	for	a	while.	This	is	part	of	what	it	means	to	say	that	agency	is	the	
medium	of	games.	The	in-game	agencies	—	their	abilities,	their	motivations	—	are	the	plastic	
medium	which	the	game	artist	manipulates	 to	achieve	their	effects.	But	when	we	seek	to	
gamify	ordinary	life,	we	are	trying	to	impose	value	clarity	on	a	pre-existing	thicket	of	values.	
This	is	the	worry	with	Twitter.	Twitter	can	grant	us	the	emotional	security	and	existential	
 
9	Some	other	games	offer	a	few	different	currencies	of	success,	but	even	then,	those	various	currencies	
are	usually	compatible.	In	many	computer	role-playing	games,	for	example,	I	am	offered	both	experience	
points	and	gold,	with	no	clear	explanation	of	which	I	am	to	pursue.	Though	there	is	no	direct	exchange	rate	
between	the	two	currencies,	they	go	hand-in-hand.	Usually	the	path	to	more	experience	points	is	through	
more	gold,	and	vice	versa.	So	for	success	I	can	aim	to	maximize	both.	
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relief	of	value	clarity,	but	we	must	adopt	Twitter’s	narrowed	targets	in	exchange.		
	
	
How	Twitter	changes	discourse	
McGonigal	views	gamification	as	providing	nothing	but	a	motivational	boost.	The	analy-
sis	I’ve	offered	shows	the	problem	with	that	view.	We	get	those	extra	motivational	elements	
—	pleasure,	fun,	engagement	—	in	exchange	for	substantively	changing	the	goals	of	the	ac-
tivity,	and	so	changing	the	activity	itself.	The	gamified	design	of	Twitter	influences	discourse	
by	inviting	its	users	to	change	the	goals	of	their	participation	in	discourse	—	to	simplify	those	
goals	in	exchange	for	pleasure.10		
Let	me	stipulate	a	bit	of	terminology.	Let	us	call	the	designed	technology	which	offers	
points	and	scores	“design	for	gamification”.		And	let	us	use	“gamification”	to	refer	to	those	
cases	when	a	player	interacts	with	design	for	gamification	and	actually	adopts	those	points	
and	scores	as	primary	motivators	during	the	activity	—	when	the	activity	actually	does	be-
come	something	like	a	game	for	them.	Notice	that	you	can	need	to	actually	adopt	these	clear	
goals,	at	least	for	the	moment,	to	get	the	pleasures	on	offer.	
Consider	 some	of	our	ordinary	goals	 for	 communication.	We	may	wish	 to	 collectively	
 
10	My	view	here	is	much	opposed	to	Ian	Bogost’s	famous	argument	that	“gamification	is	bullshit”.	Bogost’s	
argument	here	is	that	gamification	is	bullshit	because	the	term	‘gamification’	was	used	so	flexibly	and	varia-
bly	by	corporate	profiteers	that	the	term	was	essentially	useless	—	that	it	was	a	pure	buzzword,	with	no	con-
tent	(Bogost,	2011).	As	my	discussion	shows,	gamification	is	a	specific	phenomenon	with	clear	techniques	
and	identifiable	consequences.	The	fact	that	salespeople	have	used	the	term	poorly	does	not	undermine	the	
usefulness	of	the	term	itself.	Interestingly,	I	do	think	that	gamification	is	bullshit,	but	in	a	different	sense.	
Harry	Frankfurt’s	discussion	of	bullshit	can	be	read	in	the	following	way:	bullshit	is	an	activity	that	has	been	
diverted	from	its	usual	goal	(Frankfurt,	2005).	In	that	specific	sense,	I	do	think	gamification	is	bullshit.	(Bo-
gost	cites	Frankfurt’s	discussion	of	bullshit,	but	Bogost	misses	much	of	the	specificity	of	Frankfurt’s	analysis.)	
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pursue	truth	and	understanding,	or	to	promote	empathy	for	one	another.	But	Twitter’s	scor-
ing	mechanism	invites	us	to	replace	those	values	with	another,	much	simpler	goal:	that	of	
maximizing	one’s	Likes,	Retweets,	and	Follower	counts.	Twitter’s	measures	are	a	radically	
simplified	—	and	quite	impoverished	—	rendition	of	the	wide	plurality	of	values	for	commu-
nication	we	might	hope	to	find	across	a	community	of	conversers.	For	one	thing,	we	have	
evidence	aplenty	that	what	makes	something	go	viral	is	not	its	truth,	or	the	degree	to	which	
it	promotes	understanding.	Recent	studies	have	shown	that	tweets	loaded	with	strong	moral	
emotions,	like	outrage,	are	far	more	likely	to	go	viral,	via	an	effect	that	researchers	call	“moral	
contagion”	(Brady	et.	al.,	2017).		
But	a	gamification	booster	might	resist	this	portrayal.	They	might	suggest	that	Twitter’s	
scoring	mechanism	does	an	adequately	good	 job	of	reflecting	 the	 true	plurality	of	values.	
Perhaps	individuals	have	their	own	values	for	which	they	come	to	Twitter.	But	those	values	
guide	when	each	individual	user	decides	to	Like,	Retweet,	or	Follow.	Thus	Likes,	Retweets,	
and	Follower	counts	serve	as	useful	measures	of	overall	success	against	a	plurality	of	values,	
since	they	function	to	aggregate	individual	approval.	
But	being	guided	by	an	aggregate	measure	of	the	audience’s	approval	is	a	far	cry	from	
being	guided	by	one’s	own	internal	sense	of	value.	First,	pressing	Like	is	a	quick	reaction.	It	
typically	records	a	user’s	positive	first-impression	response	to	a	tweet.	So	if	we	evaluated	
our	communicative	attempts	by	their	Like	counts,	we	would	be	effectively	biased	in	favor	of	
tweets	that	users	immediately	enjoy.	We	would	be	effectively	biased	against	slow-burn	con-
tent	—	against	those	ideas	that	lingered	in	the	memory	and	revealed	their	depths	slowly.	It	
seems	far	more	likely	that	a	user	will	Like	a	tweet	if	it,	say,	expresses	a	view	that	they	already	
agree	with,	 than	one	that	presents	a	challenging	or	subtle	view	that	the	user	will	have	to	
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wrestle	with	for	a	while.	This	is	not	because	tweets	somehow	can’t	be	profound	by	their	very	
nature.	Rather,	it	is	a	feature	of	how	Twitter’s	interface	captures	the	data	to	feed	its	metrics.	
A	user	might	eventually	come	to	appreciate	a	challenging	tweet,	but	they	are	far	less	likely	
to	go	back	and	find	that	tweet,	weeks	later,	to	press	Like.	Slow	appreciation	is	far	less	likely	
to	be	captured	by	the	system	and	be	counted	towards	that	tweet’s	score.	And	insofar	as	we	
have	become	gamified,	then	we	will	judge	our	own	communicative	success	in	terms	of	that	
recorded	score.		
Second,	Twitter	scoring	emphasizes	the	total	number	of	Likes,	rather	than,	say,	the	depth	
of	engagement	or	lasting	effect	of	a	particular	communication.	This	sort	of	problem	plagues	
all	sorts	of	large-scale	value	aggregations.	Consider	Matt	Strohl’s	criticism	of	the	movie-re-
view	 aggregator	 site	Rotten	Tomatoes.	 Rotten	Tomatoes	 surveys	 the	 online	 reviews	 of	 a	
movie	and	reduces	them	each	to	a	simple	binary:	was	it	a	positive	or	negative	review?	And	
then	Rotten	Tomatoes	produces	an	aggregate	percentage	of	positive	reviews.	Notice,	says	
Strohl,	how	this	influences	the	results.	A	movie	which	strikes	every	critic	as	a	little	bit	above	
average	will	score	100%	on	Rotten	Tomatoes	and	show	up	at	the	top	of	the	heap.	A	movie	
which	divides	 the	critics	—	which	some	critics	 find	utterly	brilliant	and	other	critics	 find	
baffling	—	will	show	up	with	a	50%	score,	and	appear,	numerically	at	least,	as	a	mediocrity.	
But	great	movies,	says	Strohl,	rarely	please	everybody.	Much	of	the	most	important	art	 is	
difficult	and	utterly	divisive.	But	the	filtering	and	aggregating	mechanism	of	Rotten	Toma-
toes	 ends	 up	 expressing	 a	mathematical	 preference	 for	more	 blandly	 agreeable	material	
(Strohl,	2017).		
Twitter’s	aggregation	method	produces	a	similar	effect.	Sometimes,	when	I’m	teaching,	I	
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say	something	to	a	whole	class	that	I	doubt	will	reach	most	students,	but	that	I	strongly	sus-
pect	will	resonate	with	one	or	two	students.	And	often,	that’s	good	enough	for	me.	But	Twit-
ter	scores	each	tweet	with	a	simple	binary	measurement:	either	we	Like	a	tweet,	or	we	don’t;	
either	we	Retweet,	or	we	don’t.	This	binary	data	collection	screens	off,	at	the	input	stage,	any	
considerations	of	depth	of	impact	or	profundity	of	connection.	Then	Twitter	automatically,	
and	very	visibly,	aggregates	the	results	of	 that	binary	 input.	Twitter’s	scores	make	highly	
salient	the	number	of	users	with	positive	reactions,	while	de-emphasizing	the	quality	of	any	
particular	interaction.	Insofar	as	we	come	to	be	motivated	by	Twitter’s	scores,	then	the	aim	
of	our	communication	will	be	subject	to	a	similar	biasing	effect	as	with	Rotten	Tomatoes.	We	
will	prefer	those	communications	that	appeal	to	the	greatest	number	—	even	if	that	appeal	
is	marginally	positive	—	rather	than	those	communications	that	might	reach	a	smaller	num-
ber	more	deeply.		
Third,	Twitter	scoring	aggregates	user	interests	into	a	single	monolithic	statistic,	which	
threatens	to	diminish	the	plurality	of	values	for	which	we	collectively	communicate.	Let’s	
assume,	for	the	moment,	that	every	Twitter	user	Likes	those	tweets	which	in	a	way	that	ac-
curately	reflects	their	particular	interests	in	communication.	(In	other	words,	assume	that	
the	last	two	problems	don’t	apply.)	Even	so,	gamification	will	result	in	a	homogenization	of	
the	values	for	which	various	actors	communicate.	Pre-gamification,	each	tweeting	user	will	
be	motivated	by	their	own	particular	values	in	communicating,	giving	us	a	diversity	of	com-
municators	 with	 different	 and	 distinctive	 motives.	 Such	 a	 diversity	 of	 interests	 is	 quite	
healthy,	epistemically	speaking.	Cognitively	diverse	communities	do	better	at	figuring	things	
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out.11	Suppose,	now,	that	the	entire	community	succumbs	to	gamification	and	start	chasing	
popularity	by	Twitter’s	metric.	Post-gamification,	we	have	a	body	of	communicators	identi-
cally	motivated	to	satisfy	the	same	mixed	populace.	We’ve	replaced	a	diversity	of	motivations	
with	a	motivational	monolith.	(Here’s	one	way	to	make	the	damage	apparent:	imagine	the	
difference	between	a	world	of	artists	each	motivated	by	their	own	aesthetic	sensibility,	ver-
sus	a	world	of	artists	each	motivated	to	satisfy	the	largest	number	of	their	fellow	artists.12)			
These	three	arguments	approach,	from	different	angles,	the	same	central	idea:	that	Twit-
ter’s	scoring	mechanisms	offer	a	simplified	rendition	of	the	rich	plurality	of	our	values.	They	
refract	our	interests	through	the	particular	prism	of	Twitter’s	information	collection	system,	
and	then	average	the	result.	And,	 insofar	as	this	simplification	comes	in	an	attempt	to	re-
optimize	the	activity	for	pleasure,	we	should	expect	it	reduce	that	activity’s	capacities	to	per-
form	its	other	functions.	At	most,	we	might	have	hoped	for	a	compromise	between	pleasure	
and	the	original	goals	of	the	activity;	but	such	a	compromise	would	require	a	careful,	inten-
tional	design	effort.	And	we	have	little	evidence	that	Twitter’s	design	for	gamification	arose	
from	any	such	careful	attempt	to	support	the	plurality	of	communicative	values.	We	have,	
instead,	plenty	of	reason	to	think	that	its	design	features	were	heavily	driven	by	an	interest	
in	increasing	user	engagement	for	the	sake	of	profit.		
Here’s	an	analogy.	Products	that	seem	good	and	exciting	in	the	store	often	turn	out	to	be	
quite	poor	in	quality.	This	superficiality	is	no	accident;	it	is	the	result	of	systematic	pressures.	
The	function	of	these	objects	has	drifted	due	to	market	forces.	Where	once	the	function	of	a	
 
11 Lu Hong and Scott Page (2004, 2007) have famously demonstrated that cognitive diversity trumps cognitive abil-
ity in groups of deliberating individuals. For a rich application of these results to political communities, see Hélène 
Landemore’s (2013, 89-117) discussion of inclusive deliberation. 
12 For a further discussion of the relationship between loyalty to personal aesthetic sensibility and a resulting land-
scape of creative diversity, see Nguyen (forthcoming).  
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shoe	was	to	help	us	walk,	now,	so	often,	the	function	of	the	shoe	is	to	get	bought.13	And	what	
gets	a	shoe	bought	is	not	its	actual	long-term	quality,	but	the	short-term	appearance	of	qual-
ity.	 I	 am	 suggesting	 that	 something	 similar	 happens	with	 gamified	 discourse	 on	Twitter.	
Gamification	changes	discourse	from	serving	the	long-term	values	of	communication	to	serv-
ing	the	function	of	gathering	the	most	Likes	and	Retweets.		
Of	course,	gamification	might	not	be	dangerous	if	it	is	managed	properly.	Here,	then,	is	a	
more	sophisticated	defense	for	the	gamification	optimist.	Perhaps	the	simplified,	gamified	
value	isn’t	actually	replacing	our	original	value,	but	simply	functioning	as	a	short-term	heu-
ristic	 for	that	value.	Cognitively	limited	beings	like	us	often	need	to	focus	on	a	short-term	
proxy	for	a	complex	value	–	like,	say,	using	one’s	increased	running	mileage	as	a	proxy	for	
health,	or	using	one’s	grades	as	a	proxy	for	educational	success.	Managed	properly,	such	heu-
ristics	can	serve	as	an	efficient	and	motivating	proxy	for	some	deeper	and	more	complex	
value.	It’s	much	easier,	on	a	day-to-day	basis,	to	aim	at	increasing	mileage	than	it	is	to	think	
about	my	health	as	a	whole.		
But	proper	management	is	key.	Heuristics,	after	all,	are	simplifications	of	the	real	thing.	
They	are	good	heuristics	insofar	they	remain	properly	tethered	to	our	deeper	values.	The	
successful	use	of	a	heuristic	 involves	a	complex	process	of	management.	We	need	to	step	
back	and	reflect	on	whether	using	the	heuristic	is	actually	helping	to	achieve	the	underlying	
values.	Increasing	your	running	mileage	might	sometimes	be	a	good	proxy	for	fitness,	but	
not	when	it	brings	irreversible	knee	damage.	We	need	to	adjust	our	heuristics	when	they	
drift.		
But	Twitter’s	design	for	gamification	discourage	appropriate	management.	First,	Twitter	
 
13	This	excellent	formulation	suggested	by	Alison	Rieheld.	
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makes	the	scoring	system	pervasive	and	highly	salient	through	its	user	interface.	The	ready	
availability	of	this	pre-fabricated,	neatly	packaged	evaluation	system	may,	by	itself,	discour-
age	further	reflection	on	one’s	values.	More	importantly,	Twitter’s	metric	is	hard-wired	into	
the	system.	Even	if	we	managed	to	discover	that	we	did,	in	fact,	want	to	adjust	the	heuristic,	
that	adjustment	is	hard	to	do	on	our	own	–	because	the	scoring	system	is	embedded	in	an	
externally-controlled	 technology.	Gamification	works	on	us,	 in	part,	 because	of	 the	 ready	
availability	of	those	quantified	evaluations.14	 In	order	to	get	the	full	pleasure	on	offer,	we	
must	assent	to	the	particular	measures	that	have	been	baked	into	the	system.	So,	unless	Twit-
ter’s	gamified	metrics	just	happen	to	the	right	heuristics	to	achieve	our	particular	values	in	
communication	–	and	to	do	so	in	perpetuity	–	then	taking	on	those	metrics	will	impede	our	
capacity	to	manage	our	proxy	targets	in	light	of	our	real	values.	And	everybody	who	uses	
Twitter	is	pressured	to	take	on	precisely	the	same	heuristic,	with	little	room	for	personal	
tailoring.	Twitter’s	interface	comes	with	a	pre-fabricated,	hard-wired	measure,	which	points	
its	users	firmly	in	the	direction	of	popularity	–	rather	than	allowing	the	user	to	search	out	
the	heuristic	that	best	matches	their	own	interests.	Of	course,	a	user	could,	conceivably,	re-
sist	the	pull	of	Twitter’s	design	for	gamification	and	impose	their	own	self-created	and	self-
managed	heuristics	on	their	tweeting.	Twitter	isn’t	actually	forcing	a	value	change	on	us.	The	
system	design	is	seductive,	but	not	compulsory.	But	Twitter	offers	us	an	intoxicating	hedonic	
reward	for	changing	our	values	along	its	pre-arranged	lines.			
These	thoughts	about	pre-fabrication	points	the	way	to	another	worry.	To	provide	the	
kind	of	carefully	engineered,	automated,	steady	feedback	that	McGonigal	praises,	we	usually	
 
14 See McGonigal’s (2011, especially 52-63) discussion of World of Warcraft, and the importance of the visible and 
steady trickle of points and rewards. 
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need	help	from	large	institutions	–	like	corporations	and	governments.	Our	choice	of	activi-
ties	–	and	the	way	we	engage	in	those	activities	–	will	then	depend	deeply	on	the	fabrication	
efforts	of	large-scale	institutions.	Suppose	that	you	find	yourself	with	a	strong	preference	for	
gamified	activities	over	ungamified	ones.	When	you	engage	in	a	particular	gamified	activity,	
you	will,	indeed,	find	yourself	more	motivated	and	more	engaged.	But	you	will	also	be	re-
stricted	to	choosing	from	the	list	of	activities	that	institutions	have	chosen	to	gamify	for	you.	
Right	now,	for	example,	there	are	popular	gamifications	available	for	language	learning,	in-
creasing	your	step	counts,	and	tracking	your	weight	loss.	But	there	aren’t	good	gamifications	
for	 learning	to	appreciate	complex	poetry	or	becoming	a	better	and	more	empathetic	 lis-
tener.	And	even	if	we	think	that	the	choice	of	gamifications	isn’t	insidious	or	manipulative	–	
even	if	the	institutions	are	well-intentioned	and	just	trying	to	help	us	lead	our	best	lives	–	we	
will	still	find	that	the	range	of	activities	available	to	us	will	be	sharply	curtailed.	Institutions	
will	tend	to	produce	gamifications	of	activities	that	more	easily	admit	of	technologized	meas-
urement.	It	is	easier	to	gamify	weight-loss	than	it	is	to	gamify	deep	aesthetic	appreciation,	
because	the	former	is	easier	to	measure	in	an	automated	way.	And	when	institutions	gamify	
activities	with	more	subtle	and	complex	aims	–	like	communication	–	then	they	will	tend	to	
tend	to	change	those	activities	to	make	the	aims	more	amenable	to	automated	measurement.	
So	a	 life	of	 gamification	will	 tend	 to	draw	us	 towards	 those	activities	which	have	 clearly	
measurable	 goals,	 or	 can	 be	 transformed	 into	 something	 with	 clearly	measurable	 goals.	
When	we	demand	the	pleasures	of	gamification	in	our	activities,	then	the	range	of	activities	
available	to	us	diminishes	–	and	the	degrees	of	freedom	we	have	within	the	activity	also	di-
minishes.	Ironically,	if	we	took	the	spirit	of	play	to	involve	something	like	some	kind	of	free-
dom	or	spontaneity	with	respect	to	one’s	values	and	activities,	then	gamification	turns	out	
 
18 
to	be	the	opposite	of	play.15		
	
How	gamification	changes	us	
So	 far,	we’ve	 discussed	 how	 gamification	 can	 change	 the	 goals	 of	 the	 activity	 and	 so	
change	how	we	conduct	the	activity.	There	is	now	a	further	question:	how	might	gamification	
change	the	users	themselves?	How	might	they	transform	the	users’	lasting	values?		
Much	depends	here	on	how	the	users	motivationally	interact	with	the	scores.	There	are	
several	 different	ways	 that	 interaction	 could	 go.	 First,	 users	 can	 treat	 Twitter	 as	 a	 game	
proper,	taking	on	its	goals	temporarily	for	the	sake	of	the	pleasure	during	the	activity.	Sec-
ond,	they	can	internalize	those	scores	and	transform	their	long-term	goals	for	communica-
tion.	Third,	they	could	keep	the	scores	at	motivational	arm’s	length,	treating	them	only	as	a	
measure	of	some	useful	resource,	but	not	permitting	the	scores	to	function	directly	in	their	
motivation	in	any	way.	Let’s	look	at	these	various	possibilities	one	by	one.		
First,	suppose	one	treats	Twitter	as	a	game	proper.	Let’s	call	such	a	person	a	game-play-
ing	user.		Such	a	user	temporarily	adopts	Twitter’s	scores	as	their	goal	while	they	play	Twit-
ter,	and	then	puts	those	goals	away	afterwards.	 In	that	case,	 their	 local	adoption	of	those	
game-goals	wouldn’t	count	as	a	long-term	change	in	their	value.	And	this	practice	would	be	
perfectly	harmless,	if	Twitter	were	really	a	game	through	and	through	—	but	Twitter	is	not.		
Real	games	have	special	properties.	As	Johann	Huizinga	famously	put	it,	a	game	occurs	in	
a	separated	place	—	a	place	he	called	“the	magic	circle”	—	where	we	take	on	alternate	roles,	
and	our	actions	took	on	alternate	meanings	(Huizinga,	1971).	Or,	as	Annika	Waern	puts	it,	
games	take	place	inside	an	interpretive	frame,	where	we	agree	to	reinterpret	the	meanings	
 
15 This view of play is fairly common in the literature, but this precise articulation is from Maria Lugones (1987).  
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of	the	acts	inside	the	game	(Waern,	2012).	These	are	philosophically	rich	descriptions	of	a	
familiar	phenomenon.	Actions	in	games	are	screened	off,	in	important	ways,	from	ordinary	
life.	When	we	are	playing	basketball,	and	you	block	my	pass,	I	do	not	take	this	to	be	a	sign	of	
your	long-term	hostility	towards	me.	When	we	are	playing	at	having	an	insult	contest,	we	
don’t	take	each	other’s	speech	to	be	indicative	of	our	actual	attitudes	or	beliefs	about	the	
world.16		
And	 there	 are,	 in	 fact,	 conversational	 practices	 that	 are	 games,	 through	 and	 through.	
These	are	explicit,	temporary	practices	where	we	conduct	conversation	while	taking	on	spe-
cific	goals,	obeying	specific	obstructions,	and	taking	on	specific	roles.	There	are	structured	
games	of	deceit,	intended	to	be	played	at	parties	or	as	tabletop	games,	like	Mafia,	Werewolf,	
The	Resistance:	Avalon,	and	Spyfall.	There	are	also	informal	conversational	games,	like	when	
we	sit	 around	and	 try	 to	 come	up	with	 the	best	 insult	 about	each	other’s	mothers.	What	
makes	the	deceit	in	true	games	morally	permissible	is	that	we	all	know,	going	in,	not	to	take	
the	in-game	speech	seriously.17	I	don’t	actually	take	your	“Yo	mama”	insults	to	be	presented	
as	reliable	 testimony	about	 the	state	of	 the	world.	Such	games	 involve	 the	voluntary	and	
consensual	entrance,	by	all	the	players,	into	an	alternative	game-space,	where	the	players	
know	to	interpret	the	actions	and	communications	inside	the	game	under	a	special	light	–	to	
not	treat	them	as	ordinary,	real-world	actions.	
 
16	The	“magic	circle”	notion	has	come	under	significant	fire,	which	I	believe	can	be	located	in	a	famously	
overstated	version	presented	in	Rules	of	Play,	an	influential	early	game-design	textbook.	According	to	that	
textbook	—	at	least,	according	to	some	readers	—	magic	circles	were	impermeable	membranes	for	meaning,	
across	which	no	moral	judgment	or	consequence	could	cross	(Salen	and	Zimmerman,	95-97).	I	am	relying	
here	on	what	I	take	to	be	a	more	minimal	and	defensible	version	of	the	magic	circle.	For	various	defenses	of	
more	reasonable	accountings	of	the	magic	circle,	see	(Stenros,	2012;	Waern,	2012;	Nguyen	2020,	177-180).	
17	For	further	discussion	of	the	moral	transition	into	game-life,	see	(Weimer,	2012;	Kretchmar,	2012;	
Nguyen,	2017).	
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But	those	aren’t	the	normative	conventions	around	most	of	Twitter.	The	majority	of	Twit-
ter	presents	itself	as,	and	is	taken	to	be,	ordinary	discourse.	For	the	most	part,	we	think	that	
people	on	Twitter	are	representing	their	real	beliefs	and	trying	to	make	claims	about	the	
actual	world.18	A	user	who	approaches	Twitter	as	a	literal	game,	then,	runs	the	risk	of	under-
mining	the	epistemic	goods	available	to	the	other	users.	Suppose	I’m	on	Twitter	to	actually	
communicate	 about	 ideas,	 and	you’re	playing	a	 game	with	Twitter	—	saying	whatever	 it	
takes	to	get	the	most	Likes	and	Retweets	for	the	sheer	fun	of	it.	If	I	don’t	realize	you’re	playing	
a	game,	then	I	will	be	profoundly	misinformed	by	your	tweets.	Those	who	approach	Twitter	
explicitly	as	a	game,	but	don’t	clearly	mark	themselves	as	game-players,	are	conversing	in	
bad	 faith.	They	are	presenting	 themselves	as	engaging	 in	a	discursive,	 epistemic	practice	
while	actually	being	guided	by	non-epistemic	motives.	And,	insofar	as	other	Twitter	users	
take	game-playing	users	as	serious	participants	in	sincere	discourse,	then	these	others	will	
be	mistaking	gaming	talk	for	serious	testimony.19		
Second,	 users	 could	 internalize	 the	 scores	of	Twitter,	 permitting	 their	 enduring	 goals	
with	to	be	influenced	by	Twitter’s	scoring	mechanism.	Twitter	makes	this	easy,	by	making	
those	scores	so	prominent	and	so	pervasive.	
 
18	An	exception	is	so-called	Weird	Twitter,	which	is	a	sub-network	devoted	to	irony	and	verbal	game-
playing,	largely	its	own,	largely	segregated	network.	But	that	is,	of	course,	a	specific	exception	—	and	not	a	
particularly	risky	one,	since	Weird	Twitter	tweets	are	so	bizarre	and	incomprehensible,	that	they	are	not	
likely	to	be	mistaken	for	ordinary	discourse.	Weird	Twitter	is	a	game	proper,	with	clear	indicators	that	the	
users	as	just	playing	around.	But	things	are	different	elsewhere	Twitter.	I	suspect	that	many	other	people	are	
playing	a	game	with	Twitter	with	political	speech,	on	the	main	stage	of	Twitter,	which	is	a	far	more	dangerous	
affair.	
19	To	put	this	into	the	technical	language	of	the	epistemology	of	testimony:	I	take	Twitter	to	be	a	context	
in	which	most	tweets	are	treated	as	“assertions”.	To	use	Elizabeth	Fricker’s	account:	when	S	asserts	that	P	to	
an	audience	H,	they	thereby	vouch	for	the	truth	of	P	to	H,	presenting	P	as	being	so,	such	that	H	can	form	belief	
that	P	on	S’s	say-so.	An	assertion	that	P	represents	the	asserter	as	knowing	P	(Fricker,	2006).	Game-playing	
users,	then,	are	presenting	non-assertions	into	an	assertoric	context,	where	others	can	be	reasonably	ex-
pected	to	treat	them	as	assertions.	
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Twitter	is	a	part	of	a	larger	phenomenon	here,	which	we	can	call	value	capture.20	Value	
capture	occurs	when:	
	
1.	Our	natural	values	are	rich,	subtle,	and	hard-to-express.	
2.	We	are	placed	in	a	social	or	institutional	setting	which	presents	simplified,	typically	
quantified,	versions	of	our	values	back	to	ourselves.	
3.	The	simplified	versions	take	over	in	our	motivation	and	deliberation.	
	
Some	examples:	starting	to	exercise	for	the	sake	of	your	health,	then	getting	captured	by	
FitBit	and	coming	to	just	care	about	your	daily	step-counts.	Going	to	school	for	the	sake	of	a	
good	education	and	coming	out	obsessed	your	GPA.	Becoming	a	pre-law	for	the	sake	of	public	
interest	and	legal	activism,	and	then	coming	to	care	more	about	getting	admitted	to	the	best	
law	school	according	the	US	News	&	World	Report’s	 law	school	rankings.21	And,	of	course,	
going	onto	Twitter	for	the	sake	of	communication,	connection,	and	shared	understanding	—	
and	coming	out	obsessed	with	maximizing	Likes,	Retweets,	and	Follower	counts.	And,	obvi-
ously,	a	high	step-count	isn’t	the	same	as	good	health;	a	high	GPA	isn’t	the	same	as	a	good	
education;	and	high	Twitter	Likes	aren’t	the	same	as	connection	or	collective	understanding.		
Value	capture	occurs	when	our	values	undergo	a	long-term	and	enduring	simplification,	
as	guided	by	the	external	metrics	provided	by	institutions	and	technologies.	The	worry	here	
isn’t	that	our	values	couldn’t	ever	be	expressed	in	quantified	form,	in	principle.	Rather,	it’s	
 
20	I	introduced	the	notion	of	value	capture	in	(Nguyen,	2020,	189-215),	though	my	views	have,	I	think,	
matured	since	that	earlier	sketch.	
21	Wendy	Espeland	and	Michael	Sauder’s	Engines	of	Anxiety	is	a	thorough	-	and	deeply	alarming	-	account	
of	how	the	USN&WR’s	law	school	rankings	have	profoundly	changed	student	motivations	(Espeland	and	
Sauder,	2016).	
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that	the	kind	of	metrics,	measures,	and	gamified	scoring	that	we	typically	encounter	in	our	
life	with	bureaucracies,	institutions,	and	corporations	are	almost	always	radical	simplifica-
tions	of	the	values	they	claim	to	be	measuring.	Those	simplifications	may	have	certain	uses	
in	 administration,	management,	 or	 large-scale	 scientific	 data-collection.	 But	 what	makes	
them	useful	for	those	functions	is,	in	fact,	their	very	simplification.		
It’s	useful	here	to	borrow	from	a	nearby	discussion:	that	of	the	simplifications	involved	
in	 bureaucratic	 quantifications.	As	Theodore	Porter	 puts	 it,	 institutional	 quantification	 is	
driven	by	an	interest	in	making	information	highly	portable.	Rich,	nuanced	qualitative	infor-
mation	is	difficult	to	manage	from	any	sort	of	informational	center.	We	need	to	strip	out	the	
context-sensitive	details	and	nuance	in	order	to	transmit	it	easily	between	contexts	(Porter,	
1996).	This	is	why	such	quantification	is	beloved	of	centralized	bureaucracies,	which	need	
to	pass	information	to	distant	managers,	and	up	many	levels	in	the	hierarchy	of	administra-
tion	(Scott,	1998).22	
This	context-stripping	standardization	also	allows	us	to	aggregate	the	information	arith-
metically.	Think,	 for	example,	of	how	teachers	assess	students.	Teachers	could	offer	each	
student	rich	and	individualized	commentary	about	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	their	
academic	work.	Such	individualized	commentary	would	be	vastly	useful	to	the	students.	But	
such	individualized	commentary	is	incredibly	hard	to	aggregate	and	manage	by	upper	level	
administrators.	How	is	an	administrator	supposed	to	compare	the	portfolio	evaluations	of	
the	art	department	with	the	mathematical	performance	of	the	statistics	students?	So	teach-
ers	are	asked	to	provide	quantified	grades	for	their	students,	which	can	then	easily	be	aver-
aged	across	classes	for	one	students,	and	across	all	the	students	in	a	department,	university,	
 
22	I	am	also	influenced	here	by	(Perrow,	2014;	Merry,	2016).	
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or	school	district.	Quantified	grades	strip	out	much	of	the	most	important	information.	But	
that	context-stripping	renders	 information	into	a	standardized	form	that	can	be	operated	
upon	arithmetically.	This	allows	managers	of	massive,	sprawling	institutions	to	bring	their	
entire	domain	into	view	—	by	putting	information	in	standardized	form	and	then	aggregat-
ing	it.	Institutional	life	exerts	a	pressure	on	information,	pushing	it	towards	quantified,	ag-
gregable	form.	Notice	that	these	forces	do	not	typically	arise	to	support	our	individual	inter-
ests,	but	instead	the	interests	of	management	and	large-scale	administration.	But,	problem-
atically,	those	quantifications	appeal	to	our	motivations	precisely	because	of	their	apparent	
clarity.	And	once	we	offer	simple,	quantified	metrics	for	success,	those	metrics	take	over	in	
the	motivations	of	so	many	people.23	
A	similar	pressure	occurs	with	overt	gamifications,	especially	ones	in	an	automated,	tech-
nological	context	—	though	the	motivations	for	simplifying	may	be	slightly	different.	In	order	
to	create	the	motivational	rewards	of	gamification,	we	need	to	provide	a	score.	In	order	to	
provide	that	score,	we	need	to	offer	reliable	scoring	mechanism.	And	in	a	large-scale,	tech-
nologized	 context	 like	 Twitter,	 that	 scoring	mechanism	 needs	 to	 function	 automatically.	
Twitter	can’t	offer	a	score	based	on	quality	of	engagement,	empathy,	or	depth	of	thought.	It	
can	only	score	us	on	what	is	easily	legible	to	its	systems:	like	whether	or	not	somebody	clicks	
on	Like.	
	Such	scores	present	a	game-like	motivational	 lure.	But	because	they	can	also	be	 inte-
 
23	For	excellent	case	studies	into	the	motivational	pull	of	quantifications,	see	Sally	Engle	Merry’s	(2016)	
study	of	the	use	of	simplified	metrics	and	indicators	in	motivating	political	action;	and	Espeland	and	Sauder’s	
(2016)	study	of	the	effects	of	law	school	rankings	on	the	motivations	of	students	and	donors.	This	brief	sketch	
of	value	capture,	quantified	bureaucracy,	and	seductive	clarity	here	will	be	developed	in	future	work.	
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grated	arithmetically,	they	can	be	used	to	generate	more	gamifications	down	the	line.	Con-
sider,	 for	example,	how	FitBit’s	 scores	nest.	FitBit	provides	me	with	a	daily	 score	 for	my	
walking.	But	that	score	can	be	averaged,	so	I	can	also	get	a	score	for	my	walking	success	each	
week,	and	each	month.	Since	other	people’s	scores	can	also	be	averaged,	the	system	can	au-
tomatically	generate	rankings	and	leaderboards,	each	of	which	provides	another	game-like	
motivational	boost.	Similarly,	Twitter’s	scores,	once	rendered	into	quantified	form,	can	be	
extracted	and	used	 to	generate	other	scores.24	For	example,	 the	explicitly	gamified	social	
network	Empire.kred	creates	a	second-order	game	out	of	social	media	scores.	Empire.kred	
is	a	virtual	stock	market,	where	 individuals	are	 the	stocks.	 Individuals	can	 invest	 in	each	
other	using	the	game’s	virtual	currency,	$Eaves.	Their	stock	value	is	based	on	their	social	
media	power,	as	modified	through	investments.	Empire.kred	harvests	various	scores	from	
other	social	media	networks	—	like	Twitter	and	Facebook,	and	then	aggregates	those	scores	
to	drive	its	virtual	stock	market.25	This	is	possible	because	those	social	media	networks	have	
already	digested	evaluations	of	user	success	into	a	standardized	and	portable	format:	a	nu-
merical	score.			
The	problem	with	value	capture	can	be	put	most	clearly	if	we	help	ourselves	to	an	as-
sumption.	There	is,	it	is	often	thought,	a	natural	aim	to	belief.	Belief	aims	at	the	truth.26	We	
can	be	tempted	by	other	motivations	to	abandon	that	aim:	to	believe	what	will	feel	pleasant	
or	make	things	easy	for	us.	But	to	do	so	is	to	abandon	the	natural	aim	of	belief;	it	is	to	subvert	
 
24	Lupton	and	Smith’s	(2017)	recent	study	of	quantified	self-tracking	show	that	many	self-trackers	are	
extremely	interested	in	the	exportability	of	self-tracking	data	—	of	the	ability	to	send	FitBit	step-counts	to	a	
spreadsheet	or	more	macroscopic	health-tracking	program.	Their	approach,	however,	is	more	tuned	to	the	
data-gathering	side,	and	pays	less	attention	to	the	motivational	possibilities	of	gamification.	
25	https://play.empire.kred	
26	This	idea	has	its	most	influential	statement	with	Williams	(1970).	For	more	recent	discussion,	see	(Vel-
leman,	2000;	Wedgewood,	2002).	
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the	activity	of	believing.	The	activity	of	earnest	discourse	also	seems	to	have	a	natural	aim,	
which	is	the	collective	pursuit	of	truth.	We	aim	to	express	what	we	think	of	as	true,	and	to	
question	 and	 challenge	 each	 other’s	 expressions,	 as	 part	 of	 our	 quest	 to	 understand	 the	
world.	But	gamification	tempts	us	to	change	our	goals	—	to	aim	at	expressions	which	max-
imize	our	score,	rather	than	those	which	aid	our	collective	understanding.	And	it	promises	
to	reward	us	for	that	change	with	pleasure.	Twitter	tempts	us	to	subvert	the	activity	of	ear-
nest	conversation	for	hedonistic	reasons.		
Besides	game-playing	users	and	value-captured	users,	 there	 is	a	 third	possibility:	 that	
users	could	treat	the	scores	of	Twitter	as	simple	reports	of	some	instrumental	resource,	use-
ful	for	the	pursuit	of	further	ends.	They	treat	Twitter’s	numbers,	not	as	setting	a	goal,	but	
merely	as	useful	data.	Let’s	call	such	person	a	value-independent	user.	Such	a	user	has	avoided	
internalizing	the	scores	of	Twitter	in	any	way.	They	have	avoided	gamification.		
Here’s	what	that	might	look	like.	Suppose	one	wanted	public	influence.	A	resource	for	
public	influence	is	having	a	Twitter	account	with	a	wide	number	of	followers	—	and	tweets	
which	are	heavily	retweeted	will	reach	a	large	number	of	people.	So	one	could	aim	for	high	
scores	simply	as	an	approximate	measure	of	that	instrumental	resource.	Such	a	value-inde-
pendent	user	wouldn’t	have	any	form	of	change	of	value	or	goals,	either	short-term,	or	long-
term.	They	also	wouldn’t	be	subject	to	the	motivational	boosts	that	arise	 from	more	fully	
inhabiting	the	scores	of	Twitter.	They	would	be	holding	those	scores	at	phenomenal	arm’s	
length.	Such	a	user,	then,	would	be	free	of	the	more	pernicious	effects	of	value	capture	and	
game-playing.	They	have	resisted	Twitter’s	invitation	to	gamification.		
Thinking	about	the	value-independent	user	helps	us	get	clearer	on	what’s	wrong	with	the	
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value-captured	user.	The	value-independent	user	manages	the	scores,	where	the	value-cap-
tured	user	is	driven	by	the	scores.	Consider,	by	way	of	analogy,	two	relationships	you	could	
have	with	money.	First,	you	could	view	it	as	an	instrumental	resource,	to	be	collected	in	pur-
suit	of	some	other	value.	Second,	you	could	treat	it	as	an	enduring	end,	to	be	pursued	for	its	
own	sake.	Somebody	who	sought	money	as	an	instrumental	resource	would	manage	their	
pursuit	of	money	in	view	of	their	larger	ends.	Somebody	who	pursued	money	as	an	instru-
mental	resource	to	happiness,	wouldn’t	take	that	high-paying	job	that	would	destroy	their	
happiness.	They	would	manage	their	pursuit	of	money,	making	sure	to	pursue	money	only	
to	the	extent	that	it	actually	helped	their	happiness.	The	person	who	pursues	money	for	its	
own	sake,	however,	has	no	such	guiding	purpose	with	which	to	manage	their	pursuit	of	the	
greatest	pile.27		
Similarly,	consider	a	user	who	comes	to	Twitter	for	the	sake	of,	say,	social	progress,	and	
sought	Followers	and	Retweets	simply	as	an	instrumental	resource	for	their	mission.	They	
have	an	external	standpoint	from	which	to	manage	their	pursuit	of	Followers	and	Retweets.	
They	wouldn’t	say	anything	in	order	to	go	viral,	for	many	such	things	they	could	say	would	
likely	undermine	their	larger	purpose.	But	the	person	who	has	been	fully	value-captured	by	
Twitter’s	scores	has	no	such	limitation.	They	will	be	driven	to	say	whatever	it	takes	to	go	
viral	and	get	those	points.		
For	the	value-independent	user,	Twitter’s	scores	are	merely	a	means.	But	for	the	value-
captured	user,	Twitter’s	scores	have	become	the	end.	The	act	of	communication	itself	has	
been	instrumentalized	to	the	end	of	Twitter	scores.	Rather	than	using	Twitter	scores	to	ad-
vance	 their	 independent	values	 in	communication,	 they	have	changed	 the	nature	of	 their	
 
27	This	paragraph	arises	from	discussions	with	Aaron	James.		
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communication	to	advance	their	pursuit	of	Twitter	scores.		
	
	
Changing	values	
The	key	notion	here	 is	 the	 idea	that	gamification	problematically	 instrumentalizes	our	
goals.	The	notion	of	instrumentalization	will	be	useful	understanding	some	of	the	socially	
toxic	behavior	which	seems	to	bloom	on	Twitter.	But	first,	we’ll	need	a	clearer	picture	of	the	
notion	of	instrumentalization.	For	that,	we’ll	need	to	look,	in	greater	depth,	at	how	and	why	
we	fashion	new	goals	for	ourselves	in	games	and	gamification.		
My	account	of	games	shows	that	the	player	has	a	rather	extraordinary	form	of	agential	
fluidity.	 During	 a	 game,	 a	 player	 takes	 on	 an	 alternate	 agency	with	 alternate	 goals.	 That	
agency	has	been	engineered	to	provide	satisfaction	for	the	player	who	adopts	it.	Gamification	
works	in	a	similar	way	—	it	offers	us	various	satisfactions,	in	exchange	for	shifting	our	goals	
along	its	engineered	lines.	Both	games	and	gamification	involve	instrumentalizing	our	goals.	
This	 is	 unproblematic	 in	 games,	 but	 deeply	 problematic	 in	 gamification.	 Why?	 Because	
games	are	a	very	peculiar	and	distinctive	sort	of	activity,	and	gamification	doesn’t	share	in	
some	of	the	most	important	features.		
The	best	account	of	the	special	nature	of	games	comes	from	Bernard	Suits’	marvelous	
attempt	to	define	‘game’.	Suits	says	that	to	play	a	game	is	to	voluntarily	take	on	obstacles	to	
make	possible	the	activity	of	struggling	to	overcome	them.	In	other	words,	 in	a	game,	the	
obstacles	are	much	of	the	point.	We	try	to	run	a	marathon,	and	what	it	is	to	run	a	marathon	
is	to	try	to	get	to	a	certain	place	while	submitting	to	various	restrictions.	We	must	run	by	our	
own	power	only	–	no	short-cuts,	no	taxis.	Those	restrictions	help	constitute	various	obstacles	
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for	our	efforts.	But,	says	Suits,	our	devotion	to	these	restrictions	shows	that	we	are	not	mo-
tivated	simply	by	the	independent	value	of	crossing	the	finish	line.	 If	we	just	cared	about	
being	at	that	particular	point	in	space,	in	and	of	itself,	we	would	take	the	most	efficient	means	
to	that	end	—	like	a	taxi.	The	fact	that	we	are	willing	to	place	extra,	unnecessary	inefficiencies	
in	our	way	indicates	that	our	interest	is	not	in	actually	achieving	the	goal	in	and	of	itself,	but	
in	achieving	it	inside	certain	specified	restrictions.	Our	interest	is	to	achieve	the	goal	by	way	
of	a	particular,	constructed	form	of	activity.	As	Suits	puts	it,	in	a	game,	the	restrictions	help	
constitute	the	very	activity	we	are	interested	in	performing.	What	it	is	to	run	a	marathon,	is	
to	run	a	certain	distance	under	one’s	own	power.	If	we	took	a	taxi,	we	wouldn’t	be	running	a	
marathon	at	all	(Suits,	2014).28	
As	I	have	argued	elsewhere,	Suits’	account	reveals	the	possibility	of	a	very	peculiar	moti-
vational	structure.29	There	are	two	different	motivational	structures	for	playing	a	game.	One	
could	be	an	achievement	player,	who	plays	the	game	for	the	value	of	winning.	Or	one	could	
be	a	striving	player,	who	takes	on	a	temporary	interest	in	winning	for	the	sake	of	engagement	
in	a	struggle.	(One	could	also	play	for	both	motivations,	in	varying	proportions.)	Striving	play	
is	a	very	special	motivational	structure;	it	involves	a	motivational	inversion	from	ordinary	
life.	In	ordinary	life,	we	take	the	means	for	the	sake	of	achieving	the	ends.	But	in	game	life,	
we	select	the	ends	for	the	sake	of	the	means.	We	take	on	a	temporary	end,	and	we	submerge	
 
28	I	don’t	think	gamified	activities	count	as	games	proper	for	reasons	that	are	tangential	to	the	topics	for	
this	paper.	Briefly,	according	to	Suits’	definition,	which	I	largely	endorse,	games	are	activities	where	the	goal	
of	the	game	is	partially	constituted	by	the	designated	restrictions	on	that	goal.	What	it	is	to	make	a	basket	in	
basketball	is,	in	part,	constituted	by	the	player’s	having	obeyed	the	dribbling	restriction.	For	a	further	discus-
sion	of	this	point,	see	Nguyen	(2020,	27-73).	The	goals	in	gamified	activities	are	not	restriction-constituted	in	
this	way.	
29	This	is	a	very	brief	presentation	of	one	argument	for	the	existence	of	striving	play,	among	several	I	
have	offered	elsewhere.	The	most	detailed	version	of	this	analysis	occurs	in	(Nguyen,	2020,	27-73).	
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ourselves	in	it.30		
When	my	spouse	and	I	play	games,	we	want	to	both	have	a	good	time,	so	we	look	for	
games	that	we’re	both	relatively	good	at.	We	can	see	the	fact	that	we’re	both	striving	players	
by	how	we	manipulate	our	capacity	to	win	in	the	long-term.	Suppose	that	we	have	found	a	
game	at	which	we	are	perfectly	matched	and	are	having	a	lovely	set	of	intense	gaming	ses-
sions	with.	Suppose	one	of	us	finds	a	strategy	guide	to	that	game.	If	that	person	were	to	read	
it	by	themselves,	they	would	pull	ahead	and	start	winning.	If	we	were	achievement	players,	
then	we	each	should	want	to	read	that	guide.	But	we	don’t,	and	it	is	perfectly	reasonable	that	
we	don’t.	We	are	willing	to	suppress	our	capacity	to	win	in	the	long-term	—	even	though	we	
try,	with	all	our	might,	 to	win	during	the	game.	Our	extra-game	behavior	reveals	 that	we	
aren’t	actually	interested	in	winning	in	any	enduring	sense.	Our	interest	in	winning	is	merely	
something	we	temporarily	adopt,	in	order	to	create	the	experience	of	that	delicious	struggle.		
And	the	goal	we	pursue	in	the	game	is	often	disconnected	from	our	enduring	goals	and	
ends	—	at	least,	disconnected	in	the	usual	linear	sense.	In	many	games,	our	real	purpose	is	
to	have	fun,	but	we	can	only	have	fun	by	trying	to	win.	But	we	don’t	really	care	about	winning;	
we	just	adopt	a	temporary	interest	in	winning	so	that	we	can	engage	in	the	fun	activity	of	
trying.	But	after	the	game	is	through,	we	can	dispense	with	that	interest	in	winning.	For	ex-
ample:	I	can	start	a	game	of	Charades	at	a	party	for	fun.	In	order	to	have	fun,	I	have	to	genu-
inely	 try	 to	achieve	 the	goals	of	 the	game	—	to	 communicate	 concepts	 through	gestures,	
without	speech.	But	after	the	game,	I	discard	that	desire.	After	all,	if	I	lost	at	Charades,	but	
we	all	had	a	good	time	together,	then	I	achieved	my	true	purpose.	Only	an	especially	poor	
 
30	Some	philosophers	may	protest	that	I	have	posited	the	impossible:	that	we	can	desire	at	will.	Please	see	
Nguyen	(2019,	451-455)	for	my	argument	that	striving	play	reveals	that	we	can,	in	fact,	desire	at	will.	
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sport	would	think	the	whole	enterprise	a	failure	because	they	had	lost	at	Charades.	
So,	when	we	justify	our	game	goals	in	striving	play,	we	do	not	do	so	in	reference	to	the	
value	of	the	goal	itself,	or	to	what	follows	from	it.	We	justify	the	game’s	goals	by	pointing	to	
the	 value	 of	 the	 activity	 of	 pursuing	 those	 goals.	 Thus,	 striving	play	 instrumentalizes	our	
adoption	of	goals.	In	striving	play,	we	adopt	a	goal,	not	for	its	own	value.	Our	adoption	of	a	
game-goal	is	justified	in	terms	of	the	activity	of	pursuit	that	goal	structures.		
Here,	then,	is	a	key	difference	between	games	proper	and	the	gamification	of	non-game	
life.	In	striving	games,	the	goals	of	games	are	temporary.	More	importantly,	they	are	discon-
nected	from	the	network	of	our	enduring	ends.	In	striving	play,	my	in-game	goal	is	winning,	
but	I	don’t	actually	care	about	winning	in	the	 long-term.	I	achieve	my	real	purpose	–	fun,	
satisfaction,	exercise	–	by	pursuing	the	win,	and	not	by	actually	winning.	And	this	is	why	it	is	
perfectly	permissible	for	game	designers	to	change	the	goals	of	game-activity.	Game-goals	
can	be	made	as	simple	and	narrowed	as	is	convenient	because	they	aren’t	directly	attached	
to	our	enduring	ends.	Game	designers	are	changing	 the	play-goals	 that	guide	an	artificial	
activity,	which	has	been	screened	off	from	many	real-world	consequences.		
But	gamification	is	an	entirely	different	matter.	In	gamification,	the	designers	are	instru-
mentalizing	 the	goals	of	our	 real-life	activities.	FitBit,	by	gamifying	exercise,	 invites	us	 to	
change	our	goals	for	our	health	and	fitness.	And	Twitter,	by	gamifying	discourse,	invites	us	
to	 change	 our	 goals	 for	 conversation,	 communication,	 and	declaration.	 Instrumentalizing	
one’s	goals	is	fine	in	striving	games,	because	the	goals	in	games	were	never	valuable,	in	and	
of	themselves,	 in	the	first	place.	But	in	real	 life	activity,	the	goals	are	often	independently	
valuable.	So	when	we	gamify	those	activities	and	instrumentalize	those	ends	for	the	sake	of	
pleasure,	we	risk	losing	sight	of	the	real	 importance	of	the	activity.	Twitter’s	gamification	
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changes	our	communicative	goals	away	from	understanding,	connection,	and	the	collective	
pursuit	of	truth,	and	bends	them	towards	something	much	more	impoverished.		
	
	
Twitter	and	toxicity	
I’ve	discussed	elsewhere	two	problematic	social	phenomena	associated	with	polarized	
discourse:	echo	chambers	and	moral	outrage	porn.	Both	of	these	phenomena	seem	to	flour-
ish	on	social	media.	We	are	now	in	the	position	to	offer	the	beginnings	of	an	explanation	for	
this	relationship.	Gamification,	echo	chambers,	and	moral	outrage	porn	all	share	a	common	
central	thread:	a	willingness	to	instrumentalize	what	ought	not	be	instrumentalized.	
Let’s	 first	get	clearer	on	these	other	phenomena.	First:	as	 I’ve	argued	elsewhere,	echo	
chambers	are	best	understood	as	structures	of	manipulated	trust.	Echo	chamber	members	
have	been	systematically	taught	to	distrust	everybody	on	the	outside	(Nguyen,	2018).		
To	put	it	more	formally:	an	echo	chamber	is	a	social	structure	in	which:		
	
	 1.	One	must	subscribe	to	a	certain	belief	system	to	be	a	member.	
	 2.	That	belief	system	includes	the	belief	that	all	non-members	are	untrustworthy,	and	
all	members	trustworthy.		
	
Thus,	echo	chambers	 inculcate	a	radical	 trust	disparity	between	members	and	non-mem-
bers.	The	belief	system	includes	some	explanation	for	why	everybody	on	the	outside	is	un-
trustworthy.	In	the	modern	landscape,	those	explanations	often	take	the	form	of	conspiracy	
theories	—	like,	“The	liberal	media	is	in	the	grip	of	George	Soros	and	totally	corrupt.”	And	
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the	trust	disparity	is	self-reinforcing.	The	more	you	trust	your	fellow	echo	chamber	mem-
bers,	the	more	their	agreement	will	confirm	your	shared	belief	system.	And	the	more	you	
confirm	that	belief	system,	the	more	you	will	trust	your	fellow	members	and	distrust	outsid-
ers.	
Compare	echo	chambers	to	a	nearby	phenomenon:	that	of	epistemic	bubbles.	An	epis-
temic	bubble	is	a	social	structure	where	insiders	aren’t	exposed	to	views	on	the	outside.	De-
spite	the	superficial	similarity,	epistemic	bubbles	and	echo	chambers	work	through	entirely	
different	mechanisms.	In	an	echo	chamber,	inside	members	may	have	plenty	of	exposure	to	
outside	views,	but	outside	voices	have	been	undermined.	Epistemic	bubbles	are	structures	
of	bad	connectivity;	echo	chambers	are	structures	of	manipulated	credence.	In	an	epistemic	
bubble,	outside	voices	aren’t	heard;	in	an	echo	chamber,	outside	voices	have	been	systemat-
ically	discredited.		
Importantly,	I’ve	argued,	many	problematic	belief	communities	have	been	misdiagnosed	
as	epistemic	bubbles.	But	actually,	they	are	mostly	the	result	of	echo	chambers.	It	isn’t	that	
climate	change	deniers,	for	example,	are	simply	unaware	of	what	climate	change	scientist	
think,	or	the	standard	publicly	available	arguments	for	climate	change.	They	are,	for	the	most	
part,	quite	well	acquainted	with	those	arguments	and	conclusions.	It	is	that	they	think	that	
the	institutions	of	climate	change	science	have	been	systematically	corrupted	and	are	un-
trustworthy.	This	helps	explains	the	intractability	of	climate	change	denialists.	Since	an	ep-
istemic	bubble	works	through	simply	omitting	outside	voices,	we	should	be	able	to	shatter	
one	simply	by	exposing	an	insider	to	more	voices	and	more	viewpoints.	We	should	expect	
epistemic	bubbles	to	go	down	with	the	first	contact	to	the	missing	evidence.	But	echo	cham-
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ber	members	are	pre-prepared	for	encounters	with	external	viewpoints	and	armed	with	ex-
planatory	mechanisms	to	dismiss	those	other	voices.	Echo	chambers	are	far	more	robust.		
Why	might	one	enter	into	an	echo	chamber?	In	my	earlier	discussion,	I	focused	on	the	
possibility	that	one	might	be	raised	in	an	echo	chamber,	and,	through	no	fault	of	one’s	own,	
been	trapped	in	an	errant	system	of	trust.	But	here	I	would	like	to	focus	on	another	possibil-
ity:	that	some	people	choose	to	enter	echo	chambers	because	being	in	an	echo	chamber	is	
more	comfortable	and	more	pleasurable.	
Life	outside	of	an	echo	chambers	is	full	of	all	kinds	of	cognitive	difficulties.	We	must	con-
stantly	 struggle	with	 conflicting	 evidence	 and	 unexplained	 phenomena.	 And	we	 are	 con-
fronted,	over	and	over	again,	with	evidence	of	our	own	cognitive	fallibility.	These	confronta-
tions	humble	us	—	which	is	good	for	us,	but	also	quite	painful.		
Echo	chambers	banish	all	 that	epistemic	friction.31	They	remove,	 through	distrust,	 the	
impact	of	disagreeing	voices.	Instead	of	having	to	cope	with	new	evidence,	echo	chambers	
typically	present	their	members	with	clear,	coherent	stories	about	the	world.	Instead	of	the	
humbling	confrontation	with	the	evidence	of	one’s	errors,	echo	chambers	offer	their	mem-
bers	the	joys	of	unanimity	and	uninterrupted	confidence.	
And	notice:	these	joys	are	very	much	akin	to	the	joys	of	value	clarity	that	we	found	in	
games.	And	both	forms	of	joy	emerge	from	similar	engineered	conditions.	Games	involve	re-
designing	the	agent’s	goals	and	abilities	for	pleasure.	Echo	chambers	involve	re-engineering	
their	members’	belief	system	and	trust	settings	for	pleasure.	And	echo	chambers	are	danger-
ous	because	they	re-engineer,	not	some	temporary	and	segregated	belief	system,	but	real-
 
31	I	am	influenced	here	by	Jose	Medina’s	(2012)	account	of	epistemic	resistance,	though	I	emphasize	the	
idea	that	the	experience	of	and	the	processing	of	epistemic	resistance	is	comfortable,	and	synthetic	epistemic	
environments	engineered	to	be	resistance-less	are	quite	pleasurable.	
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life	belief	systems	which	govern	real-life	action.		
We	can	now	see	the	higher-level	similarity	between	gamification	and	echo	chambers.	In	
gamification,	we	instrumentalize	our	real-life	goals.	In	particular,	the	gamification	of	Twitter	
involves	instrumentalizing	the	goals	associated	with	discourse.	Gamification	involves,	to	a	
significant	degree,	abandoning	the	aim	of	truth	and	understanding,	and	taking	on	a	simpler	
goal	—	where	that	goal	was	engineered	for	the	sake	of	pleasures	of	value	clarity.	Echo	cham-
bers	also	involve	instrumentalizing	our	belief	systems,	abandoning	the	aims	of	having	the	
beliefs	that	are	true,	and	trusting	the	people	that	are	reliable.	And,	in	exchange	for	abandon-
ing	these	epistemic	aims,	echo	chambers	offer	their	members	the	pleasures	of	confidence,	
simple	coherence,	and	unity.	
There	is	an	interesting	complexity	in	the	instrumentalization	here.	There	are	two	levels	
of	explanation	for	these	simplifying	re-designs.	It	seems	plausible,	for	both	Twitter	and	for	
many	real-world	echo	chambers,	that	they	are	intentionally	designed	by	an	external	agent.	
The	re-engineering	involves	instrumentalization	at	two	different	levels:	at	the	level	of	design,	
and	at	the	level	of	adoption.	Plausibly,	Twitter’s	makers	consciously	designed	it	for	pleasure	
and	addictiveness,	for	the	sake	of	profit.	So	there	are	two	instrumentalizations	here.	First,	
Twitter’s	makers	are	designing	for	gamification	for	the	sake	of	profit,	which	they	pursue	by	
making	their	design	seductively	pleasurable	to	 its	end-users.	And	second,	those	users	are	
accepting	the	seduction,	and	gamifying	their	discourse	for	the	sake	of	pleasure.	At	both	lev-
els,	we	find	people	willing	to	forsake	the	original	goals	of	discourse	for	some	other	end.		
Similarly,	many	echo	chambers	are	plausibly	designed	for	political	control.32	To	that	end,	
 
32	This	view	might	strike	some	as	cynical.	This	is,	however,	the	picture	offered	by	Kathleen	Hall	Jamieson	
and	Joseph	Cappella	(2010)	in	their	meticulously	researched	account	of	Rush	Limbuagh	and	Fox	News’	inten-
 
35 
designers	have	a	reason	to	engineer	their	belief	system	to	be	as	pleasurable	as	possible.	Once	
again,	there	are	two	instrumentalizations:	designers	create	a	belief	system	for	the	sake	of	
political	control,	which	involves	designing	them	to	be	pleasurable	to	their	users.	Then	users	
accept	those	belief	systems	for	the	sake	of	that	engineered	pleasure.	And,	once	again,	at	both	
levels,	we	find	people	willing	to	create	or	adopt	belief	systems	for	reasons	that	bear,	not	on	
their	relationship	to	truth,	but	to	some	other	end.	
Let’s	 turn	now	to	 the	second	toxic	phenomenon:	moral	outrage	porn.	 In	earlier	work,	
Bekka	Williams	and	I	offer	an	account	of	“porn”	in	the	generic	sense.	We	mean	to	describe	
the	new,	modern	usage,	which	includes	things	like	“food	porn”,	“real	estate	porn”,	and	“closet	
porn”.	We	propose	that	a	representation	is	used	as	generic	porn	when	it	is	engaged	with	for	
the	sake	of	a	gratifying	reaction,	freed	from	the	usual	costs	and	consequences	of	engaging	
with	the	represented	content.	For	example:	food	porn	is	pictures	of	food	which	people	look	
at	to	get	immediate	gratification,	while	avoiding	the	calories,	cost,	and	hassle	of	eating	the	
depicted	food.	Real	estate	porn	is	pictures	of	expensive,	well-maintained	homes,	which	peo-
ple	 look	at	 for	 immediate	gratification,	while	avoiding	 the	costs	and	hassle	of	buying	and	
maintaining	those	actual	homes.		
This	account	helps	us	get	a	grip	on	an	important	phenomenon:	moral	outrage	porn.	Moral	
outrage	porn	is	representations	of	moral	outrage,	which	people	engage	with	for	the	immedi-
ate	gratifications	of	feelings	of	moral	outrage	—	for	the	pleasures	of	feeling	smug,	secure,	
and	confident	in	the	total	wrongness	of	the	other	side.	And	they	do	so	while	avoiding	the	
 
tional	construction	of	an	echo	chamber.	Their	book,	Echo	Chamber:	Rush	Limbaugh	and	the	Conservative	Me-
dia	Establishment,	is	one	of	the	best	early	analyses	of	echo	chamber	structures,	and	is	the	source	for	my	own	
account	of	echo	chambers.	
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costs	and	consequences	of	genuine	moral	engagement:	like	the	pains	of	struggling	to	be	mor-
ally	sensitive,	the	efforts	of	seeking	the	right	moral	beliefs,	and	the	exhaustion	of	real	moral	
action.	We	think	it	quite	clear	that	social	media	 is	suffused	with	moral	outrage	porn.	And	
moral	outrage	porn	is	quite	dangerous.	If	one	is	interested	in	using	moral	outrage	porn	for	
pleasure,	one	will	have	an	incentive	to	adopt,	not	the	right	moral	system,	but	the	one	that	is	
easiest	to	crank	for	pleasure.	One	will	likely	be	tempted	to,	say,	adopt	a	simple	and	absolute	
moral	system,	that	will	give	one	the	easiest	access	to	the	pleasures	of	smug	condemnation.		
Crucially,	our	claim	isn’t	that	moral	outrage	is	bad.	Real	moral	outrage	is	crucial.	Moral	
outrage,	when	it	emerges	from	a	well-tuned	moral	sensibility,	helps	us	to	register	injustice	
and	motivates	us	to	end	it.	The	very	problem	is	that	moral	outrage	porn	threatens	to	corrupt	
the	real	thing.	The	proper	target	of	moral	outrage	is	the	genuinely	outrageous.	But	when	we	
use	moral	outrage	porn,	we	use	our	own	moral	outrage	for	pleasure.	And	so	we	are	incentiv-
ized	to	change	our	moral	belief	system	—	to	ignore	the	truth,	and	adopt	those	beliefs	that	
will	give	us	the	most	pleasurable	outrage.	Moral	outrage	porn	invites	us	to	instrumentalize	
our	moral	beliefs	(Nguyen	and	Williams,	2020).		
So:	moral	outrage	porn	and	echo	chambers	often	occur	together,	and	they	both	seem	to	
flourish	on	social	media.	Why	might	that	be?	We	now	have	the	beginnings	of	an	explanation.	
All	of	these	phenomena	involve	hedonistic	instrumentalization,	where	we	take	an	attitude	
or	mental	state	and	modify	it	away	from	its	appropriate	target	in	exchange	for	pleasure.		
Why	might	a	similarity	of	motivational	structure	lead	to	frequent	co-occurrence?	I	sug-
gest	that	these	various	hedonistic	instrumentalizations	occur	together	because	they	appeal	
to	the	same	sorts	of	motives.	In	other	words,	the	co-occurrence	of	gamification,	echo	cham-
bers,	and	moral	outrage	porn	are	not	best	explained	by	features	of	the	individual	phenomena	
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themselves,	but	in	terms	of	the	character	of	their	likely	adopters.	In	all	of	these	cases,	main-
taining	the	attitudes	towards	their	appropriate	aim	takes	work.	Somebody	willing	to	aban-
don	an	attitude’s	appropriate	aim	and	instrumentalize	it	for	pleasure	in	one	place,	is	likely	
to	do	it	another.		
Another	way	to	put	it:	gamification,	echo	chambers,	and	moral	outrage	porn	go	together	
like	junk	food.	Different	kinds	of	junk	food	are	unhealthy	in	different	ways	—	some	are	too	
high	in	salt,	some	too	high	in	fat,	some	too	high	in	sugar.	But	the	reason	they	are	often	con-
sumed	together	is	that	they	are	all	likely	to	be	consumed	by	somebody	who	is	willing	to	trade	
off	health	and	nutrition	in	return	for	a	certain	kind	of	quick	pleasure.	The	same	is	true	of	
gamification,	moral	outrage	porn,	and	echo	chambers.	They	are	all	readily	available	sources	
of	a	certain	quick	and	easy	pleasure,	available	to	anybody	willing	to	relax	with	their	moral	
and	epistemic	standards.	
Next,	think	about	things	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	system	designer.	Imagine	yourself	
into	the	shoes	of	a	hostile	manipulator.	Let’s	say	you	wanted	to	get	people	under	your	polit-
ical	sway.	You’d	want	to	design	a	belief	system	that	was	as	maximally	catchy	and	sticky	as	
possible.	Here’s	one	way	you	could	do	it.	First,	you	could	design	a	belief	system	that	included	
provisions	to	distrust	all	outsiders	who	didn’t	share	the	belief	system.	You	could	make	that	
belief	system	utterly	clear	and	coherent,	all	the	better	to	please	its	adopters.	In	other	words,	
you’d	design	an	echo	chamber.	Second,	you	could	rig	the	belief	system	with	the	appropriate	
amount	of	moral	certainty	and	superiority	over	outsiders,	so	as	to	provide	all	the	pleasures	
of	moral	condemnation.	In	other	words,	you’d	fill	it	with	moral	outrage	porn.	Third,	if	it	were	
available,	 you’d	 want	 to	 entrench	 that	 belief	 system	 in	 a	 communication	 platform	 that	
awarded	its	users	plenty	of	clear,	direct	affirmation	for	agreeing	with	each	other.	For	that,	
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the	gamified	setting	of	Twitter	will	do	quite	nicely.	Echo	chambers	instrumentalize	our	trust;	
moral	outrage	porn	 instrumentalizes	our	morality;	and	gamification	 instrumentalizes	our	
goals.33		
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